Last week there was a bit of discussion over souls when I posted an argument, based on John Locke’s, which seemed to show that even if souls exist they don’t have anything to do with who we are.

At the time I assumed, like most people, that as a Christian I had to believe in the idea that our identity is grounded in our soul. So I decided to write an essay defending the soul from this attack. (Ok, I had to write my uni assignment on something.)

Part of the attraction was that it is a very good argument. (Read it here, or in the rest of this post.) I’m no longer convinced the soul is necessarily a Biblical idea, but I decided to post my essay here anyway. I think I’ve successfully defended the soul, what do you think?

Teaser:
Having stripped the soul of association with a body and denied it unique personality and memory, it is no wonder it is found irrelevant. It has been define out of all those features which would make it relevant!

I’m warning you, its not the easiest read – a night-before job, and pretty badly written (and dense). But if you are interested, have a read below:

The Irrelevance of the Soul

According to John Locke, it is not sensible to view personal identity as being grounded in the soul, “for the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different
substance, the personal identity is preserved”[1]. This essay will examine the argument, based on Locke’s quoted above, that even if souls exist they cannot be the seat of our identity if different souls could produce in a body the same psychology, because we have no way besides psychological characteristics to verify that a body contains the same soul. This essay will present and criticise possible defences, working within a dualistic framework. It will become apparent that the argument commits the straw-man fallacy and is also at least as guilty of the ad hoc fallacy as is the Soul Identity Theory. Ultimately, therefore, and rather unfortunately, the question becomes a matter of opinion.

The argument that the soul is irrelevant to the question of personal identity is advanced by Perry in “A Dialogue Concerning Personal Identity”[2]. Though similar to Locke’s, it is with Perry’s formulation that this essay is concerned. The argument is as follows: souls cannot be observed directly but only indirectly by observing psychology, specifically personality and memories. Since sameness of physical body correlates with sameness of psychology, we conclude the general rule that sameness of body equals sameness of soul. However, suppose other souls can have similar psychologies. If the soul inhabiting a body were to be replaced by one of these, there would be no noticeable difference and it would be impossible to know whether a person possesses the same soul from day to day. Far from being essential to our identity, the soul is instead found to be completely irrelevant and, as it makes no difference to anything observable about ourselves or others, it cannot be the basis of our identity. The soul, on the basis of this argument, does not seem sensible. How, then, can the Soul Identity Theory be defended?

One response is to assert that, in fact, personal identity isn’t continuous with the body at all. We have been wrong to think that our friend is the same person today as he was yesterday; the body does not house a single identity but rather a succession. Identity is indeed bound up in souls, of which there are a multitude and of which we may see only fleeting glimpses. This renders irrelevant the argument from irrelevance itself because it no longer matters whether one can know if a person possesses the same soul from day to day. Whilst a valid inversion semantically, this approach is profoundly unsatisfying intuitively and emotionally. It essentially separate our identity from our physical appearance, personality, attitudes, beliefs, memories, and sense of continuous consciousness, the very things usually thought of as belonging to the self . It is to deny the importance of any of those on our identity and instead define our identity purely by an immaterial entity with, according to this theory, no other characteristics. This is totally counterintuitive. Before disqualifying the theory on this basis alone, however, one ought to note that many popular philosophical positions are also counterintuitive, such as determinism and monism, and even scientific theories, such as theories of relativity or quantum mechanics. However, a more serious criticism is that there is no other basis for believing that such a soul as this exists except that it answers the argument. While not negating the possibility of its truth, this approach commits the ad hoc fallacy. In sum, this response successfully addresses the argument, but at the cost of being completely counterintuitive and ad hoc. Given these costs, it can hardly be said to make the idea of identity grounded in the soul sensible. Let us therefore turn to other attempts.

In Perry’s own writings is found another approach, which centres on our own experience. Noticing that the argument from irrelevancy discusses bodies and souls in the third person, one might argue that we have better insight into ourselves and know that our own body and soul are continuously united; then generalise this to all people. Perry offers two criticisms of this. Firstly, the generalisation from my own personal experience to the rest of humanity is too great an extrapolation. This may be countered by observing that there is nothing particularly special about our own case that would lead one to think it an exception, or by analogy to many other such generalisations we make, such as that the rest of the world has conscious experience or sees the same colours as me, or even by appealing to the corresponding experiences of others. Secondly, this defence itself is open to the same argument as it purports to answer. That is, one cannot perceive his even his own soul directly but must infer its continuity from psychological consistency, and so the argument from irrelevancy can attack even our sense of our own continuity of soul. This criticism is fatal, and thus the approach fails to show Soul Identity Theory to be sensible.

Let us turn now to defences which critique the argument itself. Firstly, it is insufficient for the purposes of the argument from irrelevancy that the psychologies be extremely similar. Consider a pair of identical twins who have extremely similar personalities. Acquaintances and even some closer relations cannot distinguish them. Their closest friends and family members find them very similar, but are able to discern some differences. According the twins themselves, each thinks the other is vastly different to themselves. The defining variable in these relationships is the degree of familiarity. Now, supposing two souls had very similar psyches. Regardless of how similar they are, one can conceive of a person who is sufficiently familiar to distinguish the two, thus a change in personal identity would be noticed should the souls swap, and consequently souls are indeed relevant to personal identity. Whilst it could be argued that in practice no-one is sufficiently familiar with anyone, even themself, and we even expect variations in mood, it is enough that it be hypothetically possible. Thus, the argument from irrelevance requires that it be possible for souls to have identical psychologies, else it fails.

Allowing for the moment that it be possible for souls to have identical psychologies, another problem arises. In order to have identical psychologies, souls must not only be identical in personality but also in memory. For the purposes of the argument from irrelevance, it does not matter whether the memories are real or apparent. However, each real memory may only be possessed by one soul, the soul that actually inhabited the body to which the memory is relevant. Thus, the argument must account for the creation of souls with apparent memories, or alternatively deny that the soul may contain memories. The latter immediately raises questions concerning how the soul contains personalities, and especially since memories seem to influence personality.

If the argument from irrelevancy is adapted to fit these requirements, that the psychology be identical and there be some way by which apparent, identical memories arise, or else that memories be denied altogether, then it seems to make the soul irrelevant. However, even thus adapted the argument contains two serious fallacies.

The first is that it is a straw man argument. Those who believe the Soul Identity Theory have a conception of the soul that is vastly different to the entity found in the argument. A traditional conception of the soul does not allow for two souls to have identical personalities any more than traditional views of people allow for identical personalities. This is self-evident, since according to the Soul Identity Theory they are the one and the same. One certainly does not need to stress the observation that no conception of the soul, nor of its relation to man or God, includes a method of creating apparent memories. Furthermore, the conception of a souls being able to survive death must contain the ability to store memories since, as Perry identifies, survival implies a relationship between the present and future identity such that it is right for the latter to remember the actions of the former. Finally, even the argument’s view of the relationship between body and soul is questionable. Souls do not traditionally flit between bodies but are rather thought to be tied to the body while it is alive. In fact, the departure of a soul is associated with death. Having stripped the soul of association with a body and denied it unique personality and memory, it is no wonder it is found irrelevant. It has been define out of all those features which would make it relevant!

The second fallacy is that the characteristics of the soul as presented by the argument are ad hoc; each having no justification other than that it addresses a criticism of the argument. This is perhaps border-line, since arguments are often refined. However, consider how far the hypothetical extends: souls are able to change bodies instantly, possess identical personalities, acquire apparent memories, and, most strange of all, only exchange bodies with other souls possessing identical personalities. Each of these is offered unjustified in response to a criticism, and are therefore ad hoc.

The traditional view of a soul presented above is also often accused of being ad hoc on account of being too conveniently perfect. It is suggested that characteristics have been added ad hoc until at last it has perfect explaining power. Regarding this criticism, there are two comments to be made. Firstly, the criticism does not develop from an analysis of the history of the concept but rather a presupposition that there are no perfect answers. Philosophers are highly critical of theories that do not offer sufficient explanations, yet also criticise theories for doing so. If one is indeed expecting to find truth, oughtn’t that truth be expected to have explanatory power. Secondly and similarly, it could be argued that the reason the soul fits our expectations of identity so well is not because we have invented the soul to fit them, but because we have expectations based on reality. The soul may be criticised for being ad hoc if it can be shown that it was thus invented, but it may not be criticised for being too perfect.

What can we say then? We are confronted with two seemingly ad hoc constructions. The argument from irrelevance implies that the soul is irrelevant to our experiences. If true, the basis of identity cannot be souls unless we abandon our current, intuitive notions of identity, for it has been shown that personal experience is of no benefit. However, this argument suffers from two important fallacies. Additionally, the argument rests on a number of hypothetical propositions which, if believed impossible, make it an irrelevant argument itself, having no basis in reality. The other option is the view of personal identity as being grounded in the soul, and it too is criticised for being ad hoc. Neither option offers any justification. Thus, the case stands as follows: if an adjudicator does not take issue with the abandonment of intuitions about personal identity, the first defence will satisfy. If they, like me, find fault with any of the hypothetical propositions required for the argument from irrelevance, or object to the fallacies, it will not be convincing. Otherwise, the soul is successfully shown to be irrelevant. Unfortunately, it comes down to one’s opinion.

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1] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, Tegg & Co., Cheapside, 1849) p. 224
2] J Perry, “A Dialogue Concerning Personal Identity” in J Perry and M Bratman (1999) Introduction to Philosophy OUP 3

© 2008 Andrew Hayes. All rights reserved

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